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ABSTRACT 
We review Danielle Macbeth’s book Realizing Reason, published by Oxford University Press in 
2014. This extensive book is composed by nine chapters in which Macbeth critically presents 
the development of  mathematical practices in the Western world – from its founding in 
Ancient Greece’s diagrammatic practices to the apogee of  mathematical logic in the 
nineteenth and twentieth-centuries – while offering a revaluation of  its present stage by 
means of  a reconsideration of  Gottlob Frege’s philosophical contributions. In this review, we 
present a summary of  each chapter’s contents and make general considerations about them. 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Danielle Macbeth’s Realizing Reason is a tour de force about the history of  
mathematical knowledge from ancient Euclidean geometry to the late 19th 
century and early 20th century developments on mathematical logic. It is an 
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ambitious work dealing with a vast array of  subjects and philosophical 
themes while still being able to consistently display a high standard of  
erudition and originality in areas as diverse as the Philosophy of  
Mathematics, Language, Science and Mind. 
The narrative of  the book is complex and multifaceted, but its main 
thread is two-fold. On one hand, Macbeth aims to develop a novel account 
of  “our being in the world” which gives room for the existence of  
normative facts in a world which is fully explained by mechanistic causal 
laws – a profound philosophical dilemma that stands at the center of  many 
authors’ works such as Kant, and, more recently, Macbeth’s former 
Pittsburgh colleague, John McDowell (1994). On the other hand, Macbeth 
argues for a reparation on the perspective with which philosophers should 
see the practice of  mathematics and the mode through which it attains 
knowledge. The author’s objective is primarily to show how the practice of  
mathematics, in each of  its historical stages from the Greeks to the present, 
by means of  its characteristic linguistic notations, enabled thinkers to 
literally amplify their knowledge, as opposed to merely making explicit what 
was already implicit in the information one had begun with. Furthermore, 
Macbeth aims to prove that this much is true even of  mathematics as it is 
currently conceived, i.e. “the practice of  reasoning deductively from 
concepts” (p. 5). One of  the author’s main challenges is to show how there 
can be such a thing as an “ampliative deduction”, and in order to achieve 
this feat, Macbeth must break through Kant’s conceptual distinctions to 
open the way for the idea that the knowledge attained by some deductions, 
which is, per definition, analytic, can, at the same time, be synthetic. 
Both issues dealt with in the book – the apparent incompatibility of  
reasons in a world of  causes and the notion of  ampliative mathematical 
knowledge – are foundational questions in Philosophy and each can be 
traced to the early beginnings of  philosophical practice itself. It is 
noteworthy that Macbeth sets out to tackle both at the same time while also 
showing how the resolution of  one question is tied to the resolution of  the 
other (and vice-versa). 
The book is divided into three main sections, each composed by three 
chapters, which chronologically tell the story of  reason’s development and 
unfolding from the Ancient Greek’s mathematical practice to the present. 
The first section is entitled Perception, alluding to Macbeth’s claim that in 
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the early stages of  our intellectual development we have our “primary mode 
of  intentional directedness in perception” (p. 17). This corresponds to a 
time before the Cartesian turn in the sixteenth century, where “pure 
intellection”, as opposed to the perception of  an object, “becomes the 
paradigmatic mode of  intentional directedness and the model even for 
perception” (p. 18). This intellectual revolution, which led us from bare 
perception to pure intellection, is the main theme weaving together the three 
first chapters. 
In Chapter 1, Macbeth presents a story detailing how perceptually aware 
beings, like ourselves, have managed to progress from our ancestors’ 
rudimentary capacities of  imitation and of  synthesizing procedural 
knowledge to sophisticated self-consciousness and rationality. Crucial to 
Macbeth’s story is a profound anti-Cartesian stance, according to which we 
should not make a division between the merely physically describable stuff  
that is “outside” and the normatively significant, meaningful experiences 
that are “inside” (p. 20). In explicit opposition to Robert Brandom (1994), 
Macbeth suggests jettisoning altogether the idea that a world described by 
means of  causes stands in contrast to a world described by means of  
reasons, as if  these concepts were not applicable to things of  the same 
nature. Just as nature acquires biological significance as animals evolve in 
their environments, e.g. a bunch of  leaves becomes food, so does nature 
become socially and culturally significant as intelligent beings begin 
cooperating, sharing goals and engaging in practices and games among 
themselves. The last step in that progression is the transformation of  social 
beings into “properly rational beings capable of  distinguishing in principle 
between how things seem and how things are” (p. 56); that is, the acquisition 
of  the capacity to step back from our natural inclinations and to realize that 
“anything we think can be called into question, and improved upon” (p. 49). 
This final stage of  intellectual development, Macbeth claims, depends 
fundamentally on the coming into being of  a natural language, which is, 
albeit contingent and historical, not an obstacle to objectivity, but 
constitutive of  our access to it. 
Notwithstanding their importance, natural languages are intrinsically 
grounded on our perceptual means of  access to the world, and, for that 
reason, do not reach far enough so as to provide us with knowledge of  all 
there is to be known about in the world. In chapter 2, Macbeth delves 
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deeply into Ancient Greek mathematics - exemplified by Euclidean 
diagrammatical practice, a methodology that would be the unchallenged 
orthodoxy in Western mathematical thought for centuries until the 
Renaissance – in order to make clear how the unfolding of  reason takes us 
ever more far from our immediate empirical reality. Macbeth’s central claim 
in this chapter is that, in Euclidean diagrammatical practice, we do not 
reason on diagrams, but in them; in other words, Macbeth claims that an 
Euclidean diagram does not merely describe a certain course of  
mathematical reasoning (as, for example, we could describe a mathematical 
demonstration on natural language), it “formulates the contents of  concepts” in a 
mathematically tractable way and, for that reason, constitute – as opposed to 
merely picturing or describing – the reasoning itself. As Macbeth fleshes out 
that important distinction, it becomes ever clearer how demonstrations in 
Euclidean geometry managed to amplify our knowledge, often giving rise to 
discoveries that were not even implicit in what the demonstration had begun 
with. Differently from an Euler or Venn diagram (or any other types of  
“picture proofs”), in an Euclidean diagram “what is displayed are the 
contents of  concepts the parts of  which can be recombined with parts of  
other concepts”. So, for example, a certain mark in a diagram may be seen as 
either the side of  a triangle or the radius of  a circle, depending on the 
perspective that the reasoner impinges on the drawing. The possibility of  
this “gestalt-shift” (absent in, e.g. Euler and Venn diagrams) is what explains 
how figures often pop-up in an Euclidean proof  - such as when an 
equilateral triangle appears as if  from nowhere in the proof  I.1 of  the 
Elements - and thus, how “something new can emerge that was not there 
even implicitly”. 
Chapter 3 leads us to the radical departure from Ancient thought that 
happens during the Renaissance with the rise of  Modern philosophy, 
physics and mathematics. Macbeth is particularly concerned with Descartes’ 
influence in the emergence of  a new mathematical practice by means of  the 
introduction of  the language of  elementary algebra. The algebraic method 
adds a new degree of  abstraction to the activity of  reasoning, Macbeth 
argues, since its intentionality is not object-oriented, but directed to the 
merely potential relations which arbitrary objects may instantiate (p. 132). 
For example, one begins to interpret geometrical objects in a 
computationally tractable way, as the arithmetical relationship of  some 
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lengths (e.g. a square is some quantity multiplied by itself). By abstracting 
away from objects, and, thus, from any subject matter in particular, 
Descartes’ language allows “pure intellection to become (at least in 
intention) an actuality” (p. 149). Similarly to the language of  Euclidean 
geometry, Descartes’ algebraic method is not to be conceived as merely a 
tool through which a course of  reasoning can be described or pictured; 
instead, these symbolic languages present content in a mathematically 
tractable way, and, because of  that, are the matter by means of  which 
reasoning itself  is constituted, or, to use Macbeth’s terminology, reasoning 
comes into existence in those symbolic languages, as opposed to being 
merely described on them. 
The next triad of  chapters is entitled “Understanding”, referencing the 
fact that Kant’s legacy to Philosophy entails that “pure reason is not and 
cannot be a power of  knowing as Descartes had thought. Not reason but 
only understanding is a power of  judgement, of  knowing” (p. 151). This is 
precisely what chapter 4 is concerned about, more particularly, Kant’s 
Copernican revolution, by means of  which our epistemic access to reality is 
turned upside-down, requiring “the philosopher […] to focus not 
unthinkingly on the object of  knowing but self-consciously on the power of  
knowing, on what reason requires of  objects as objects of  knowledge” (p. 
199). Macbeth’s argues that, as groundbreaking as Kant was, his thought was 
still pretty much restrained by the scientific, and, most importantly, the 
mathematical practice of  his day, which, absent the revolution that would 
come in the nineteenth-century, could not ground a proper account of  
mathematical truth and knowledge – that is, an account of  mathematical 
truth and knowledge answerable to things as they are in themselves, as 
opposed to things as they merely appear to us. 
Chapters 5 and 6 present the new form that mathematics has come to be 
clothed in by means of  the collective effort of  intellectuals throughout the 
nineteenth-century. By means of  the work of  mathematicians such as 
Bolzano, Galois and Riemann, Macbeth tells us the story of  how 
mathematics, after twenty-five centuries of  development, finally becomes a 
self-standing discipline, “the work of  pure reason wholly unfettered by the 
contingencies of  our form of  sensibility” (p. 244). However, not all is well 
with that sudden reshaping of  mathematical practice, since, if  mathematics 
answers to nothing outside of  its own activity, as it came to be seen, it starts 
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to look as if  mathematics is nothing more than a linguistic game, completely 
disconnected of  any struggle for objectivity. 
Indeed, for much of  the twentieth-century, Macbeth will go on to argue, 
a cluster of  theses based on (i) the distinction of  logical form and 
semantical content, (ii) a truth-theoretical account of  meaning and (iii) a 
primacy of  mathematical logic as the ruler of  all formal disciplines will go 
on to become the orthodoxy in the understanding of  mathematics and of  
its practice. This is, according to Macbeth, a very unfortunate event, since it 
seems force on us a picture of  logic and mathematics as being merely 
formal disciplines, and, for that reason, completely deprived of  intentional 
properties. Even worse, and this is one of  the central points of  the book, 
this is the picture that intellectuals born during the twentieth-century (even 
the best of  them), have accepted without subjecting it to scrutiny, i.e. a 
picture of  reasoning as being purely mechanistic, “nothing more than the 
rule-governed manipulation of  signs with no regard for meaning” (p. 293). 
In the last group of  three chapters, aptly entitled “Reason”, Macbeth 
purports to analyze the philosophical problems that are engendered by the 
last great revolution in mathematics, i.e. when it came to be seen as “a 
practice of  deductive reasoning on the basis of  defined concepts” in 
nineteenth-century Germany. Most pressing to the author’s concerns is 
showing that this new conception of  the mathematical practice is not purely 
formal in the sense that it came to be seen by philosophers, but, on the 
contrary, that it is intrinsically meaningful and often enables us to attain 
knowledge in the strongest sense of  that concept, that is, objective 
knowledge about things in themselves.  
In chapter 7, Macbeth takes the reader to a confrontation, for the first 
time, with Gottlob Frege’s Begriffsschrift, a mathematical notation that “was 
explicitly designed as a notation within which to reason deductively from 
concepts in mathematics”. This long chapter goes at great lengths to explain 
Frege’s concept-script because, as Macbeth defends, one must understand 
the notation in order to be able to see the mode of  reasoning embodied 
within it. The pinnacle of  the chapter, however, is Frege’s proof  of  theorem 
133 in Part III of  the Begriffsschrift, which Macbeth presents as being a real 
example of  a deduction that establishes a real extension of  one’s knowledge. 
The particularity of  that proof  is the book’s central concern until its very 
end, namely, the fact that it joins content from two definitions, as opposed 
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to merely joining content from two axioms. That operation of  bridging the 
content from two previously unconnected definitions is precisely what 
enables that mathematical practice to amplify one’s knowledge. Just as 
figures often pop up in a Euclidean diagram, “as if  from nowhere”, some 
deductive proofs link concepts that were independently introduced and 
which, absent that proof, would display no immediate connection among 
themselves. 
That much gets clearer throughout chapter 8, where Macbeth argues that 
definitions, although they are, by nature, stipulative, are not epistemically 
vacuous, since they serve to articulate the inferential content of  particular 
concepts, and that is something one might – objectively – succeed in doing 
correctly or not. Definitions, however, do not amplify one’s knowledge by 
themselves; it is only in the context of  a proof  that they are able to forge 
new links within one’s conceptual repertoire: 
 
proofs without definitions are empty, merely the aimless 
manipulation of  signs according to rules; and definitions without 
proofs are, if  not blind, then dumb. Only a proof  can actualize the 
potential of  definitions to speak to one another, to pool their 
resources so as to realize something new. (p. 387) 
 
The conception of  reasoning that we reach by the end of  the book is, 
contrary to the Early Modern simulacrum that we have unreflectively 
inherited, is neither reductive nor mechanistic. It does not purport to reduce 
the content of  concepts to primitive notions, instead, those contents are 
displayed in a mathematically tractable way. It is also not mechanistic, 
Macbeth claims, since the knowledge attained by a deductive proof  may be, 
at the same time, both analytic and synthetic – a fact that makes Kant’s 
dichotomies stand in need of  a radical revision. 
The book’s narrative comes full-circle by the end of  chapter 8 and 
throughout chapter 9, where Macbeth studies the case of  physics, about 
which she draws a parallel between the nineteenth-century revolutions in 
mathematics and the twentieth-century revolutions in theoretical physics. 
The underlying theme is that mathematics and physics have both recently 
undergone profound revolutions, while philosophy “has, until now, 
remained merely Kantian” (p. 453). The final blow on the Cartesian view 
that we have inherited from the early moderns involves disentangling the 
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Sinn/Bedeutung distinction from that of  concept and object (a 
disentanglement that was out of  reach for Kant). Only by clarifying those 
distinctions, we can understand “how a radically mind-independent reality 
and an unconditioned spontaneity are not only compatible but in the end 
made for each other” (p. 451). 
Realizing Reason suffers from a flaw that is an almost inevitable 
consequence of  its virtues. Macbeth’s overambition, i.e. her attempt to leave 
no stone unturned, leads to her book having a certain bric-à-brac quality, since 
the thread that unites her narrative throughout highly distinct subject 
matters is usually, but not always, evident. Regardless of  that, this book 
presents innovative theses in a multitude of  areas, of  special interest being 
its analysis of  Frege’s work, which sees his accomplishments from a whole 
new perspective and as giving rise to a heterodox conception of  ampliative 
deductive knowledge. All in all, Realizing Reason is a recommended read for 
anyone with interests in the broad set of  areas encompassing the philosophy 
of  mathematics, mathematical practice, history of  mathematics and logic, 
and who is interested in seeing how the issues on those areas communicate 
with issues in the philosophy of  mind, language and the history of  
philosophy.   
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